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JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION ACT
LAUREN E. TRIBBLE†
ABSTRACT
Generally, Chapter 7 bankruptcy is available to only the most
desperate individual debtors who do not have the means to pay their
creditors back over time. Before 2005, the Bankruptcy Code gave
judges discretion to decide which debtors were eligible for Chapter 7.
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Act, however, curtails this
discretion, mandating that judges use a rigid means test to determine
when a debtor is allowed to file. This Note argues that it was a poor
decision to foreclose judicial discretion with the means test. It then
proposes a compromise between the means test approach and the old
standard.

INTRODUCTION
Each year, over one million people file for Chapter 71 bankruptcy
in hope of relief from outstanding debt.2 Chapter 7 is the simplest
form of bankruptcy: debtors relinquish their unnecessary assets, and
in exchange, they are allowed to walk away from any remaining
obligations.3 Most Chapter 7 cases feature down-and-out debtors,
who, outside of bankruptcy, would probably never have been able to
4
repay their creditors. In these typical situations, Chapter 7 works to
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thanks to John Niles for his ideas, encouragement, and support.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 700–785 (2000).
2. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 3–4 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 90.
3. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 149 (5th ed. 2006).
4. Id. at 119 (“[T]he great majority of the bankrupt debtors are overwhelmingly in
debt.”).
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the benefit of both debtors and creditors. Creditors who were
unlikely to be repaid outside of bankruptcy receive at least a portion
of their due, and debtors are left alone to get back on their feet.
Sometimes, however, debtors ask for an immediate discharge under
Chapter 7 even though, outside of bankruptcy, they could pay their
creditors back over time.5 These situations are very different than the
typical ones. Here, creditors lose out because debtors make a
conscious choice not to pay what they owe.
Contrast, for instance, the examples of Shirley Nichols and Kim
Basinger. Before she became ill, Shirley Nichols was a financially
6
responsible woman who, if anything, worked “entirely too hard.” In
her thirties, however, Shirley unexpectedly fell sick and could not
7
work for fourteen months. While out of work, she charged medical
bills to her credit cards, eventually building thirty thousand dollars of
8
debt. Although Shirley ultimately recovered and found a new job,
she was unable to pay off her debt.9 After “agoniz[ing] over [the
decision] for a month,” she filed for bankruptcy.10 “I don’t have
11
another option,” she told reporters. While in bankruptcy, Shirley
moved into a house with six roommates to cut costs.12
13
In contrast, Kim Basinger’s career began as a model. By the
14
time she was twenty, she was making one thousand dollars per day.
Kim later appeared in hundreds of ads, television shows, and
15
movies. After making Batman in 1989 and The Marrying Man in
1991, she bought her hometown of Braselton, Georgia, for $20
million.16 In 1993, however, Kim backed out of a movie contract with

5. E.g., In re Lamanna, 153 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1998) (considering the Chapter 7 petition of
a debtor with means to pay his creditors back over time).
6. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer: Bankruptcy Law? (PBS television broadcast June 8,
1998) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june98/bankrupt_68.html).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The Internet Movie Database, Biography for Kim Basinger, http://www.imdb.com/
name/nm0000107/bio (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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17
her studio. The studio sued her, and a jury found her liable for $8.9
18
million. After the judgment, Kim discharged her debt in
bankruptcy.19 Although forced to sell Braselton,20 Kim was soon back
on her feet and made $5 million in 2000 for her movie I Dreamed of
21
Africa.
Most agree that the Kim Basingers of the world should not be
22
allowed to escape their debt through Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Such
individuals do not need bankruptcy protection because they have the
ability to pay off their debts over time. Chapter 7 should generally be
reserved for debtors who, like Shirley Nichols, are unable to pay their
debts outside of bankruptcy and therefore have no other option. The
disagreements, then, are about how to decide which debtors are able
to pay23 and about whether there should be any exceptions to the
general rule that debtors who can pay over time cannot use Chapter 7
24
to discharge their debt.
Before 2005, the Bankruptcy Code left these questions to
25
individual bankruptcy judges. Judges determined a debtor’s ability
to pay under the individual facts and circumstances of each case.26
Even if a debtor was able to pay, judges had discretion to allow the
bankruptcy filing if the debt was incurred because of an unexpected
emergency, such as a medical tragedy.27 Congress placed almost no

17. Matt Walsh, Boxing Ameritech, FORBES, Oct. 10, 1994, at 18.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Biography for Kim Basinger, supra note 13.
21. Id.
22. Before 2005, in every circuit but one that addressed the issue, ability to pay was the
primary factor in deciding whether to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition. See infra notes 64–68 and
accompanying text.
23. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. V 2005) (measuring ability to pay with an objective
means test), with 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000) (leaving the ability to pay determination to the
discretion of bankruptcy judges).
24. Compare In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991) (stipulating that although
ability to pay is a primary factor, the totality of the circumstances must be considered), with 11
U.S.C. 707(b) (Supp. V 2005) (disallowing any exceptions to the general rule that debtors who
can pay over time cannot use Chapter 7).
25. See generally Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.) (leaving
discretion to judges).
26. E.g., In re Kornfield, 164 F.3d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1999).
27. See In re Green, 934 F.2d at 572 (including sudden injury, illness, and disability as
factors to be considered as part of the totality of circumstances for a case).
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28
restrictions on these judicial determinations. Although judges
generally exercised their discretion in accord with common sense,29
the lack of congressional guidance occasionally allowed for outlier
cases like that of Kim Basinger.
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
30
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) in part out of
dissatisfaction with bankruptcy judges and in reaction to cases like
Basinger’s.31 The BAPCPA almost completely curtails the discretion
judges had under the previous regime. It mandates that judges
measure ability to pay using a mechanized objective formula known
as the means test32 and severely limits judicial discretion to adjust
33
means test results.
This Note argues that it was a poor decision to completely
foreclose judicial discretion with the means test. Although judges do
need more guidelines than they had prior to 2005, the BAPCPA is
too rigid. The situation demands a compromise between the
BAPCPA’s approach and the old standard. Part I of this Note
describes who can file for Chapter 7, noting both what the law used to
be and what it is under the BAPCPA. Part II points out the flaws in
the new statute and argues that the BAPCPA’s means test was a
policy mistake. Finally, Part III offers suggestions for change,
proposing a compromise between the BAPCPA’s formulaic means
test and the previous regime. Under this compromise, Congress
would issue general guidelines about which debtors qualify for
Chapter 7. Past that, Congress would allow judges discretion to

28. Although the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act set “substantial
abuse” as the standard for refusing bankruptcy protection, the statute failed to define
“substantial abuse.” Id. at 570–71; In re Balaja, 190 B.R. 335, 337 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); In re
Heller, 160 B.R. 655, 657 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993).
29. See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO INCOME TRAP: WHY
MIDDLE CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 81 (2003) (emphasizing that most
Chapter 7 bankruptcies during the 1980s and 1990s were filed by families under pressure
because of medical costs, job loss, or divorce).
30. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119
Stat. 23 (2005).
31. Credit industry lobbyists, Jeff Tassey among them, argued that judicial discretion was
not a sufficient barrier to bankruptcy abuse. Tassey said of bankruptcy judges, “They’re part of
the . . . problem. . . . They’re not real judges . . . .” Peter G. Gosselin, Judges Say Overhaul
Would Weaken Bankruptcy System, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2005, at A1.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. V 2005) (establishing the means test).
33. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)–(b)(3) (limiting the situations in which judges have discretion to
allow a bankruptcy petition for a debtor who fails the means test).
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distinguish between those debtors who need Chapter 7 and those who
are abusing the bankruptcy system.
I. THE HISTORY OF CHAPTER 7
Traditionally, individual debtors have had two bankruptcy
34
options: Chapter 13 and Chapter 7. Both options potentially enable
debtors to discharge a portion of their debt.35 The primary difference
between Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 is that in Chapter 13, debtors
promise to make partial payments out of their future income but keep
their present assets, whereas in Chapter 7, debtors surrender their
present assets in return for a fresh start going forward.36
In Chapter 13, debtors promise to turn over a portion of their
future income for at least three years under a wage earner’s plan.37
The portion of monthly income that debtors are required to pay is
based on what they can afford, given their income and reasonable
expenses.38 Money that debtors turn over under the plan is then used
39
to recompense their creditors in order of priority. After they
complete a wage earner’s plan, debtors are no longer liable for their
remaining debt.40 Debtors who owe over a certain dollar limit,
41
however, are ineligible to file for Chapter 13.
Alternatively, debtors may elect to pursue an immediate
discharge of their debt under Chapter 7. Chapter 7 is intended to give
42
the “honest but unfortunate” debtor an opportunity for a fresh start.

34. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 281.
35. See id. (noting both that Chapter 7 debtors can freeze immediate assets and get relief
from certain future obligations and that Chapter 13 debtors pay future income up to an agreed
payout amount and subsequently get relief from their remaining obligations).
36. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (2000) (“Except as provided in a confirmed plan or order
confirming a plan, the debtor shall remain in possession of all property of the estate.”), with 11
U.S.C. § 726(a) (Supp. V 2005) (outlining priority for distribution of present assets).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2000) (specifying the contents of a wage earner’s plan).
38. Id. § 1325(b)(1)–(2) (requiring that all “projected disposable income” be distributed to
unsecured creditors under the plan and defining “disposable income” as current monthly
income “less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended” for certain purposes).
39. Id. § 1322(a)(2) (providing for the full payment of all claims entitled to priority).
40. Id. § 1328(a) (stating that no discharge will be granted until all payments under the plan
have been made).
41. Id. § 109(e).
42. In re Johnson, 318 B.R. 907, 919–20 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005) (“The most fundamental
goal of the bankruptcy code is to relieve an ‘honest but unfortunate debtor’ of his indebtedness,
allowing him to make a ‘fresh start.’”); In re Reynolds, 193 B.R. 195, 200 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996)
(noting that the Bankruptcy Code’s “overriding purpose” is to afford “honest but unfortunate”
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43
The fresh start has a long tradition in American bankruptcy law, and
it has been available to certain American debtors since the enactment
of the first permanent Bankruptcy Act in 1898.44 Without it, people
who never expected or intended to incur debt might be forced to
spend their lives working to pay their creditors, never able to take
home their own pay.45 At committee hearings on the BAPCPA,
Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts explained the tradition of a fresh
start in American bankruptcy law:

In 1833, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story . . . explained . . . that
bankruptcy laws were intended to . . . relieve unfortunate and honest
debtors from perpetual bondage to their creditors. He said that
bankruptcy legislation should relieve the debtor from a slavery of
mind and body which robs his family of the fruits of his labor.
One hundred years later, the Supreme Court emphasized Justice
Story’s views . . . . The power to earn a living, the Court said, is a
“personal liberty,” and:
from the viewpoint of the wage-earner there is little difference
between not earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor.
In short, the same fundamental values which led this Nation to
46
abolish debtors’ prisons, also led us to offer debtors a fresh start.

Under Chapter 7, a fresh start is available only to those debtors
willing to relinquish all of their nonexempt assets.47 Chapter 7 debtors
may keep only their exempt assets, which generally cover basic needs
48
like clothing and shelter. The relinquished assets are liquidated, and
the proceeds are distributed to creditors on a priority basis.49 After

debtors a “fresh start”); see also In re Bammer, 112 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The
Bankruptcy Code is ‘designed to afford debtors a fresh start . . . .’”), withdrawn, 131 F.3d 788
(9th Cir. 1997).
43. 151 CONG. REC. S1836 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
44. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 10–11 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 97.
45. 151 CONG. REC. S1836 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
46. Id.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (Supp. V. 2005) (providing for the distribution of all of the nonexempt
assets as property of the estate).
48. See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (listing assets included in “expenses” and therefore exempt
from creditors).
49. Id. § 726.
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this distribution, debtors are no longer liable for the remaining debt.
“[They] can get back to work or start a new business, flat broke and
without much in the way of assets, but knowing that the benefits of
51
tomorrow’s hard work will not go to the creditors.”
Generally, creditors receive less in consumer bankruptcy cases
filed under Chapter 7 than in those filed under Chapter 13. This is
true, in part, because debtors who have few present assets can
discharge their debts under Chapter 7 without making any significant
52
payments. Creditors have long argued for limitations on Chapter 7,
especially when debtors with few present assets have the means to
pay back their loans over time.53 Congress first responded to this
54
concern with the Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.
A. The First Limitations on Chapter 7: The Federal Judgeship Act
Before 1984, debtors had virtually unfettered access to Chapter
7. Courts could deny them access only “after notice and a hearing
56
and only for cause.” For-cause dismissals required egregious acts,
such as making false statements on a bankruptcy petition or
unreasonably delaying court proceedings.57 As long as debtors were
honest with the bankruptcy court, they had the option to relinquish
all their nonexempt present assets in exchange for a total discharge of
all of their debts under Chapter 7, notwithstanding their financial
58
situations.
55

50. Id. § 727 (providing for discharge).
51. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 149.
52. See § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv) (requiring only that the debtor relinquish nonexempt assets
to obtain a Chapter 7 discharge).
53. See Jean Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy Reform: The Need for
Simplification and a Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1302 (2006) (noting that the credit
industry pushed for limitations on Chapter 7 from 1978 to 1984 and again throughout the 1990s).
54. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1982) (“The court may dismiss a case under [Chapter 7] only after
notice and a hearing and only for cause, including . . . unreasonable delay by the debtor . . .
[and] nonpayment of any fees and charges . . . .”).
56. Id.
57. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5793 (noting
that a debtor would be granted a Chapter 7 discharge except in cases of “specific and serious
infractions on [the debtor’s] part”).
58. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1982) (“The court may dismiss a case under [Chapter 7] only
after notice and a hearing and only for cause . . . .”).
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Creditors were understandably uncomfortable with this
59
arrangement. It allowed debtors who could easily have paid off their
loans over a few years to opt not to do so by filing for Chapter 7.60
Consider, for example, a hypothetical young lawyer: just graduated
from law school, with sixty thousand dollars in credit card debt, no
nonexempt personal assets, and having accepted a law firm job paying
one hundred and sixty thousand dollars. Given the high earning
potential, this young professional could easily pay off the credit card
debt within a few years. With no nonexempt personal assets,
however, the lawyer could wipe out the debt in Chapter 7 without any
personal sacrifice whatsoever.
In 1984, Congress responded to this situation with the Federal
61
Judgeship Act (FJA). The FJA gave judges discretion to dismiss
filings that were a “substantial abuse” of the Bankruptcy Code.62 In
the FJA, however, Congress gave very little guidance as to what
63
constituted substantial abuse. As a result, a large body of case law
64
developed on the matter. By 2005, most circuits had issued decisions
65
on the substantial abuse standard.

59. See Braucher, supra note 53, at 1302 (noting that the credit industry pushed for
limitations to keep debtors with sufficient disposable income out of Chapter 7 in the years
leading up to the 1984 Act).
60. Before 1984, a debtor’s level of disposable income did not affect whether the debtor
would be able to file for Chapter 7. See generally Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (containing no disposable income requirement).
61. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.).
62. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 703 (Supp. V 2005) (“After
notice and a hearing, the court . . . may dismiss a case . . . if it finds that the granting of relief
would be a substantial abuse . . . .”).
63. E.g., In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 570–71 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Balaja, 190 B.R. 335, 337
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); In re Heller, 160 B.R. 655, 657 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993).
64. See, e.g., In re Cortez, 457 F.3d 448, 454–56 (5th Cir. 2006) (considering whether
debtor’s postpetition employment developments should be included in substantial abuse
determinations); In re Behlke, 358 F.3d 429, 436–37 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that retirement sum
contributions should be included in disposable income calculations for purposes of substantial
abuse determinations); In re Price, 353 F.3d 1135, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that purchase
money mortgage debt was “consumer debt” for purposes of substantial abuse determinations);
In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796, 808–09 (10th Cir. 1999) (surveying circuit court case law regarding
the definition of “substantial abuse” and adopting the “totality of the circumstances” approach);
In re Kornfield, 164 F.3d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1999) (comparing the “ability to pay” approach with
the “totality of circumstances” approach and concluding that “[e]ven under the former
approach, the debtor’s personal circumstances are relevant to the determination of ability to
pay”); In re Lamanna, 153 F.3d 1, 3–5 (1st Cir. 1998) (adopting the “totality of circumstances”
test and rejecting “any per se rules mandating dismissal for ‘substantial abuse’ whenever the
debtor is able to repay his debt out of future disposable income”); In re Kestell, 99 F.3d 146, 149
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In every circuit but one that addressed the question, the primary
factor in determining substantial abuse was the ability of debtors to
66
pay their creditors outside of Chapter 7. Courts measured ability to
pay by deducting the debtor’s reasonable monthly expenses from
67
expected monthly income. If there was a substantial amount left
over for the creditors, courts were likely to dismiss the Chapter 7
68
petition.
When courts determined ability to pay under the FJA, they had
discretion to adjust reasonable monthly expenses and expected
69
monthly income in light of individual circumstances. In In re
70
Kornfield, the Second Circuit noted that “the debtor’s personal
71
circumstances are relevant to . . . ability to pay.” The court
explained, “[A] per se test would not survive the first case of a frugal
family with income over the designated level but with unusually large
medical expenses necessary to a child’s life.”72 Personal circumstances
could also weigh in favor of dismissal of a Chapter 7 petition. In In re
Lamanna,73 the First Circuit held that despite his low income, the
74
debtor could not file for bankruptcy. Because the particular debtor

(4th Cir. 1996) (employing the “totality of circumstances” approach to find substantial abuse by
husband who used the bankruptcy system to ensure that his former wife could not collect on a
debt he owed her); In re Green, 934 F.2d at 570–73 (holding that the fact that debtor had income
in excess of his necessary expenses was not sufficient to support a substantial abuse
determination and remanding case for a consideration of the “totality of the circumstances”); In
re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126–27 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding a dismissal on substantial abuse
grounds and noting that “a court should ascertain from the totality of the circumstances whether
[the debtor] is merely seeking an advantage over his creditors, or instead is ‘honest,’ . . . and
whether he is ‘needy’”); In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 984–85 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding a
dismissal on substantial abuse grounds because “the courts below properly considered [the
debtor’s] future income in applying the ‘substantial abuse’ language”).
65. See In re Cortez, 457 F.3d at 454–55; In re Behlke, 358 F.3d at 436–37; In re Price, 353
F.3d at 1139–40; In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796 at 808–09; In re Kornfield, 164 F.3d at 781; In re
Lamanna, 153 F.3d at 3–5; In re Kestell, 99 F.3d at 149; In re Green, 934 F.2d at 570–73; In re
Krohn, 886 F.2d at 126–27; In re Walton, 866 F.2d at 984–85.
66. Even in the Fourth Circuit, ability to pay was a factor (though not necessarily the
primary factor) in determining bankruptcy abuse. In re Green, 934 F.2d at 572–73 n.7.
67. See, e.g., In re Krohn, 886 F.2d at 127 (evaluating ability to pay based on income and
reasonable expenditures).
68. Id. at 127–28 (dismissing the Chapter 7 petition because the debtor had ability to pay).
69. In re Kornfield, 164 F.3d at 781.
70. In re Kornfield, 164 F.3d 778, 778 (2d Cir. 1999).
71. Id. at 781.
72. Id. at 783.
73. In re Lamanna, 153 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998).
74. Id. at 5.
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in Lamanna was living with his parents, he had lower expenses and an
75
increased ability to pay.
Courts developed some general rules of thumb for how to
determine income and expenses. Expected monthly income could be
adjusted to take into account postpetition events, such as promotion
76
or job loss. Also, assets that would be exempt in a bankruptcy
proceeding, such as retirement distributions, were not necessarily
barred from reasonable monthly income calculations.77 Finally,
secured loan payments were not deducted from monthly income in
78
determining ability to pay.
Even though ability to pay was the primary factor in determining
abuse in most circuits, in no circuit did ability to pay, standing alone,
mandate dismissal. Judges always had discretion to consider other
79
factors, including:
(1) Whether the bankruptcy petition was filed because of sudden
illness, calamity, disability, or unemployment;
(2) Whether the debtor incurred cash advances and made consumer
purchases far in excess of his ability to repay;
(3) Whether the debtor’s proposed family budget [was] excessive or
unreasonable;
(4) Whether the debtor’s schedules and statement of current
income and expenses reasonably and accurately reflect[ed] the
true financial condition; and
80
(5) Whether the petition was filed in good faith.

75. Id.
76. In re Cortez, 457 F.3d 448, 458 (5th Cir. 2006).
77. See In re Koch, 109 F.3d 1285, 1289 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[R]evenues received from exempt
sources during the life of a Chapter 13 plan are ‘income,’ the disposable portion of which must
be paid to unsecured creditors if the plan is to be confirmed . . . .”).
78. In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 127 (6th Cir. 1989) (taking into account the debtor’s high
monthly mortgage in determining whether the debtor could cut back and pay his creditors).
79. The Ninth Circuit in In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988), left open the suggestion
that ability to pay might per se constitute substantial abuse. Id. at 914–15. It made clear in later
cases, however, that judges had discretion to allow a Chapter 7 filing even if there was ability to
pay. In re Price, 353 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004).
80. In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991). These factors are examples of criteria
utilized by a court in determining whether substantial abuse exists in a particular case. Courts
have utilized a variety of criteria under the “totality of the circumstances” standard. See, e.g., In
re Price, 353 F.3d at 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2004) (considering the five factors in Green as well as
“whether the debtor has engaged in eve-of-bankruptcy purchases”); In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796,
809 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing “the factors articulated by the other courts as instructive, but
conclud[ing] [that] they are not inclusive of all factors considered”); In re Snow, 185 B.R. 397,
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Beginning in the 1990s, creditors became dissatisfied with the
81
FJA and began to push for more limitations of Chapter 7.
Specifically, creditors wanted a bright-line means test that would
restrict judicial discretion to allow Chapter 7 filings when the debtor
had sufficient disposable income.82
B. More Limitations: The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act
Despite the FJA’s limitations on Chapter 7, the number of
bankruptcy filings rose dramatically between 1978 and 2005.83
Creditors contended that the increase in filings reflected an
unacceptable decline in financial responsibility and an increased
willingness to file for bankruptcy.84 Congress answered with the
BAPCPA, which instituted a mechanized, objective test, known as
85
the means test, to determine ability to pay. This test, according to
Congress, would be a more trustworthy tool than judicial discretion in
rooting out abuse.
The BAPCPA was intended to prevent bankruptcy abuse by
“restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy
system and ensur[ing] that the system is fair for both debtors and
creditors.”86 Congress enacted the BAPCPA because it felt that
judicial discretion under the FJA was not sufficient to prevent certain
debtors from using bankruptcy as a “first resort, rather than a last
resort.”87 Insofar as the BAPCPA was passed to correct the FJA’s

404 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (noting that Green and similar cases “may be collectively
summarized as requiring an analysis of the facts and circumstances of the individual case”).
81. Braucher, supra note 53, at 1302.
82. Credit industry lobbyists expressed concern that bankruptcy judges were unable or
unwilling to clamp down on abusive debtors. When asked whether judicial discretion was
sufficient to curb bankruptcy abuse, Jeff Tassey, an influential credit industry lobbyist, replied,
“They’re part of the . . . problem. . . . They’re not real judges . . . .” Gosselin, supra note 31; see
also Jack F. Williams, Distrust: The Rhetoric and Reality of Means-Testing, 7 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 105, 108 (1999) (noting that those who favor means testing generally seek to restrict
judicial discretion). See generally H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998) (providing an example of a
bright-line means test proposal).
83. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 3–4 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 90.
84. Id. at 4 (citing a growing perception that bankruptcy is used as “a first rather than a last
resort”).
85. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102,
119 Stat. 23, 27–35 (2005).
86. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
87. Id. at 4.
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failures, it was a response to the perceived inability of the bankruptcy
88
bench to recognize and crack down on abusive debtors.
The BAPCPA was designed to ensure that no abusive debtor
slips through the cracks. It requires every debtor to submit means test
89
calculations to the court before filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The
U.S. Trustee’s office must then review means test submissions and
90
send a statement reporting the test’s outcome to every creditor. The
bankruptcy judge “shall presume abuse exists” if the means test
shows that the debtor has sufficient income to make meaningful
payments on the debt.91
1. Means Test Mechanics. How exactly does the means test
evaluate whether debtors have the ability to pay down their debt over
time? Put simply, the test asks two questions. First, it asks whether a
debtor’s monthly income is above the median income in the state in
which the debtor resides.92 If so, the test then goes on to ask whether
the debtor’s income minus expenses leaves enough money for the
93
debtor to make payments to creditors. If the answer to both
questions is yes, the debtor is presumed to be abusing the bankruptcy
system.94 In the vast majority of these cases, the judge then dismisses
95
the Chapter 7 filing.
The means test mechanizes both income and expense
calculations. It provides that current monthly income is the average of
the debtor’s monthly income from the six months preceding the
96
filing. All types of income—including employee wages, interest,
stock dividends, unemployment compensation, and income tax
97
refunds—are includable in income determinations. If current
monthly income, as defined by the BAPCPA, is greater than the
median income in the state in which a debtor resides, the debtor must

88. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
89. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005).
90. Id. § 704(b)(1).
91. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
92. Id. § 707(b)(6).
93. Id. § 707(b)(2).
94. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
95. Id. § 707(b)(2)(B) (allowing the presumption to be rebutted only under limited “special
circumstances”).
96. Id. § 101(10A).
97. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 160.
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complete the second step of the means test to determine Chapter 7
98
eligibility.
After a debtor has calculated current monthly income, the means
test allows a deduction of certain expenses from that amount to
99
determine disposable income. There are three categories of
deductible expenses. First, the debtor may deduct certain basic living
expenses, such as expenses for housing, transportation, taxes, food,
clothing, and health care.100 The amount a debtor may deduct for
these expenses is determined by standards set by the IRS rather than
101
by the debtor’s actual expenditures. Second, debtors may deduct
payments on secured and priority debts.102 These payments include
the total of all payments contractually due to secured creditors in the
five years following bankruptcy and any other “payments to secured
creditors necessary for the debtor to maintain possession of [a]
primary residence, motor vehicle, or other property necessary for the
support of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents that serves as
collateral for secured debts.”103 There is no limit on the amount of
secured loan payments that a debtor may deduct from income for the
104
purposes of the means test. Finally, the debtor may deduct actual
expenses for a limited class of expenses specified by the Bankruptcy
105
Code. These include the actual cost of reasonably necessary health
insurance, disability insurance, health savings accounts, and the actual
cost of protection from domestic violence.106
The amount of monthly disposable income—which is measured
by income minus authorized expenses—dictates whether or not a
debtor passes the means test.107 If disposable income is $100 or less,

98. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (Supp. V 2005).
99. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii).
100. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
101. See id. (providing that debtors are allowed to deduct the amounts specified in the
Internal Revenue Service’s Allowable Expense Tables); see also Internal Revenue Service,
Collection Financial Standards, http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96543,00.html (last
visited Nov. 10, 2007) (showing deductible amounts for basic living expenses).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(a)(iii) (Supp. V 2005).
103. Id.
104. See id. (not limiting the amount of deductible secured loan payments); WARREN &
WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 164 (“[Secured] loans—such as car loans—can be deducted in
full, no matter how large, along with any payment arrearages.”).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 2005).
106. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
107. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
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108
the debtor passes the means test and may continue Chapter 7
proceedings without a presumption of abuse.109 If disposable income is
greater than $166.66, the test identifies the debtor as able to pay,110
111
and a presumption of abuse arises against the debtor. If disposable
income is between $100 and $166.66, the debtor passes the means test
only if the amount of disposable income is less than 0.4167 percent of
112
the total unsecured debt. Unless income minus expenses is between
$100 and $166.66, the amount the debtor owes is not relevant to the
abuse determination.113

2. When Do Judges Have Discretion to Correct the Means Test?
When a debtor fails the means test, judges have no choice but to
114
presume abuse. Section 707(b) of the BAPCPA states that judges
“shall presume abuse exists if . . . income reduced by . . . expenses [is
greater than $166.66 per month].”115 Once established, the
116
presumption of abuse is extremely difficult to rebut. “It may only be
rebutted by demonstrating special circumstances, such as a serious
medical condition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed
Forces.”117 Furthermore, special circumstances are only relevant to the
extent that they necessarily affect future income or expenses.118 It is

108. Id.; WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 164–65 (translating the statute).
109. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (providing no presumption of abuse when the debtor
passes the means test).
110. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i); WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 164–65 (translating the
statute).
111. Id. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. V 2005).
112. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 165 (providing that if a debtor’s
disposable income is between $100 and $166.66 per month, the debtor passes the means test
only if disposable income is less than 25 percent of the unsecured debt divided by sixty).
113. See 11 U.S.C § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (not factoring the amount of debt in the determination
of abuse unless the debtor’s disposable income is between $100 and $166.66).
114. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
115. Id.
116. See id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (“In any proceeding brought under this subsection, the
presumption of abuse may only be rebutted by demonstrating special circumstances . . . that
justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no
reasonable alternative.”).
117. Id. To establish special circumstances that rebut the presumption of abuse, the debtor
must provide supporting documentation and “a detailed explanation of the special
circumstances that make such expenses or adjustments to income necessary and reasonable.” 11
U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 2005).
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (noting that special circumstances are relevant to the
extent “they justify additional expenses or adjustments to current monthly income for which
there is no reasonable alternative”).
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not per se a special circumstance, for example, if a debtor files for
bankruptcy because of a medical emergency. Even if the medical debt
is completely involuntary and very large, the medical emergency
counts as a special circumstance only to the extent that it affects the
119
debtor’s future income and expenses.
Judges have more discretion in the opposite direction, to
presume abuse when a debtor passes the means test. Section
707(b)(3) states that when the presumption of abuse “does not arise
or is rebutted, the court shall consider whether the petition was filed
in bad faith; or [whether] the totality of the circumstances . . . of the
120
debtor’s financial situation demonstrates abuse.” Courts agree that
under this provision, judges may dismiss filings when a debtor passes
the means test but acts in bad faith. It is more questionable, however,
whether this provision allows judges to dismiss filings when they
believe that a debtor who passes the means test has ability to pay.
Some commentators argue that judges do have such discretion
121
under the plain language of § 707(b)(3), which allows judges to find
abuse when a debtor passes the means test but the “totality of the
circumstances of . . . [the] financial situation demonstrates abuse.”122
123
Courts that accept this approach rely on pre-BAPCPA case law to
determine whether the totality of the circumstances of the debtor’s
situation demonstrates abuse.124
Others argue that judges do not have discretion to dismiss filings
when the debtor passes the means test.125 They contend that the
means test is the sole measure of ability to pay and that it trumps pre-

119. Id.
120. Id. § 707(b)(3).
121. See, e.g., Hon. Eugene R. Wedoff, Judicial Discretion to Find Abuse Under Section
707(b)(3), 71 MO. L. REV. 1035, 1035–51 (2006) (arguing that a judge has some discretion to
dismiss filings when the judge believes that a debtor who passes the means test has the ability to
pay).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3).
123. See, e.g., In re Pak, 347 B.R. 239, 244 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that judges may
dismiss the petition of a debtor who passes the means test if the totality of the debtor’s financial
situation demonstrates ability to pay); In re Paret 347 B.R. 12, 17 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (same).
124. See, e.g., In re Paret, 347 B.R. at 17 (accepting trustee’s argument that even when a
debtor passes the means test, the debtor can be held to be abusing the Bankruptcy Code based
on pre-BAPCPA case law).
125. Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors, 13 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 667 (2005); see also In Re Walker, No. 05-15010-whd, 2006 Bankr.
LEXIS 845, *20 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 1, 2006) (holding that courts may not find abuse when
the debtor passes the means test, even if the debtor becomes able to pay later on).
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126
As Professor
BAPCPA totality-of-the-circumstances case law.
Elizabeth Warren states, “It is one thing for a judge to be aggressive
in the interpretation of ‘substantial abuse’ . . . when there are no other
‘can-pay’ provisions. It is quite something else to look past Congress’
specific instructions and add a second judge-made can-pay test.”127
Regardless of which side of this debate is correct, judges have less
128
discretion under the BAPCPA than under the FJA. The result is
that the lets some debtors who are abusing the bankruptcy system
into Chapter 7 while keeping certain honest but unfortunate debtors
out.

II. WHY THE MEANS TEST WAS A POLICY MISTAKE
Because the means test replaces judicial discretion with a rigid
and formulaic rule, it is both over- and underinclusive as to its
primary goal of preventing abuse. It catches debtors who legitimately
need relief by failing to take into account why the debtor incurred the
debt129 and by mechanizing income and expenses in ways that can
130
overstate the debtor’s actual disposable income. It also creates
loopholes that allow affluent debtors to qualify for Chapter 7 by
understating their actual expenses. Finally, although the means test
replaces a fuzzy standard with a bright-line rule, it is not more
efficient. The Congressional Budget Office estimates it will cost
almost $400 million over its first five years.131
A. The Means Test Catches Debtors Who Legitimately Need Relief
The means test overshoots its abuse prevention goal by catching
some debtors who are legitimately in need of relief. It does this first

126. Culhane & White, supra note 125, at 667.
127. Id. (quoting e-mail from Professor Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law,
Harvard Law School, to listserv Bankr-UNLV (May 31, 2005, 8:09 CDT)).
128. Even if the BAPCPA is interpreted to allow judges discretion to dismiss petitions when
the debtor passes the means test, the statute explicitly states that judges do not have discretion
to allow petitions when the debtor fails the means test. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. V
2005).
129. See generally id. § 707(b)(2) (not factoring into the means test why the debtor incurred
the debt).
130. See id. § 101(10A) (mechanizing the calculation of current monthly income); id.
§ 707(b)(2) (mechanizing expense calculations).
131. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE FOR BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 1, available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
61xx/doc6130/s256.pdf.
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132
by failing to take into account why a debtor incurred debt. It thus
fails to distinguish between a chronic overspender and a family forced
into bankruptcy by a large and unexpected expense. Second, the
means test mechanizes the calculations of income and expenses in a
way that might not reflect the debtor’s actual financial situation.133
When, because of one of these deficiencies, the means test prevents a
needy debtor from filing for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy judge rarely
has discretion to correct the result.134

1. The Means Test Ignores the Reason for Filing. There are a
variety of reasons, some less sympathetic than others, why a person
might file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. At one end of the spectrum, a
debtor might run up one too many credit card bills with new cars and
expensive jewelry. At the other, a financially responsible person
might incur overwhelming debt because of a serious medical problem.
In the middle, a family breadwinner might become unemployed, and
thus be unable to cover even modest expenses. In light of the
tradition of American bankruptcy as a last-ditch safety net for the
“honest but unfortunate debtor,”135 and in light of the legislative goal
of preventing abuse,136 the law ought to treat these very different
situations differently.
Prior to the BAPCPA, it did. Under the FJA, judges had
discretion to take into account why the debtor was filing for
bankruptcy when deciding whether to allow the bankruptcy
petition.137 In In re Green,138 the Fourth Circuit directed lower courts
to consider the cause of the bankruptcy—“whether the bankruptcy
petition was filed because of sudden illness, calamity, disability, or

132. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (not factoring into the means test why the debtor
incurred the debt).
133. See supra note 130.
134. Id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (providing that when a debtor fails the means test, a judge has
discretion to allow a Chapter 7 filing only under limited special circumstances); Culhane &
White, supra note 125, at 667 (arguing that because the means test is the sole measure of abuse,
when debtors pass the means test, judges do not have discretion to dismiss their Chapter 7
filings). But see Wedoff, supra note 121, at 52 (arguing that judges do have discretion to dismiss
petitions even when a debtor passes the means test).
135. See supra note 42.
136. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92 (noting
that the BAPCPA will cut down on bankruptcy abuse).
137. See supra Part I.A.
138. In re Green, 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991).
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139
unemployment.” The First, Second, and Tenth Circuits explicitly
adopted the Fourth Circuit’s approach.140 Every other circuit that
addressed the issue agreed that judges were not required to find
abuse when the debtor had ability to pay; they could look at other
factors, including the debtor’s reason for filing. Even the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits—which had the most creditor-friendly interpretations
of the FJA—held that judges had discretion to look at the debtor’s
reason for filing for bankruptcy.141
Under the BAPCPA, by contrast, the debtor’s reason for filing is
generally irrelevant. The reason for filing never affects whether a
142
debtor passes or fails the means test. In limited situations, the
reason for filing can affect whether the presumption of abuse is
rebuttable: the BAPCPA allows a debtor to rebut the abuse
presumption under “special circumstances, such as a serious medical
143
condition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed Forces.”
These special circumstances, however, are relevant only insofar as
they affect the debtor’s income or expenses.144 A good reason for
filing is irrelevant unless it affects the debtor’s presumed income or
145
expenses in the future. Generally, therefore, bankruptcy judges
have no choice but to treat the most sympathetic debtor—one who is
financially responsible but falls down-and-out due to a bout of
unexpected bad luck—in the same manner as a chronic and
manipulative overspender.146
Consider, for example, a financially responsible accident victim
who incurs eight hundred thousand dollars in accident-related
medical expenses. Over the course of a few years, the victim recovers
and gets back to work—taking home $170 in disposable income per

139. Id. at 572.
140. In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796, 809 (10th Cir. 1999); In re Kornfield, 164 F.3d 778, 781 (2nd
Cir. 1999); In re Snow, 185 B.R. 397, 402 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).
141. In re Price, 353 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that although ability to pay
standing alone is sufficient to prove abuse, it does not necessarily lead to that finding); In re
Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 984–85 (8th Cir. 1989) (same).
142. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
143. Id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (providing that the presumption is rebuttable under special
circumstances, which are generally circumstances in which the debtor has a good reason for
filing for bankruptcy).
144. Id. (stating that the presumption may be rebutted under special circumstances only “to
the extent such special circumstances that [sic] justify additional expenses or adjustments of
current monthly income”).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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month—but begins to realize that this is not enough to pay off even
147
the interest on the medical debt. Facing an impossible situation, the
debtor files for bankruptcy but fails the means test because the past
medical emergency affects neither future income nor future expenses.
The accident is therefore not a special circumstance sufficient to rebut
the means test result. The bankruptcy judge—unable to consider
either the large size of the debt or the sympathetic reason for filing—
must deny this debtor a Chapter 7 chance for a fresh start.148
2. The BAPCPA Mechanizes Income and Expense Calculations
in Ways that Can Overstate Disposable Income. Another way that the
BAPCPA keeps needy debtors out of Chapter 7 is by mechanizing
income and expense calculations in ways that can overstate actual
income and understate actual expenses.149 The means test can
overstate income because it presumes that current monthly income is
the average of a debtor’s monthly income in the six months prior to
filing.150 This presumption wrongly assumes that all debtors have a
constant stream of income in the months before and after their
bankruptcy filing, which is just the time when many debtors are
experiencing financial dislocations.151
The presumption can be problematic for debtors who file for
bankruptcy because they have lost their jobs and cannot find new
152
ones with comparable salaries. In those situations, the means test
has the potential to overstate current monthly income by factoring in
153
a debtor’s old salary. To determine current monthly income, the

147. At the modest rate of 8 percent, the first month’s interest on an $800,000 debt would be
$5,351.20.
148. Debtors who cannot file for Chapter 7 are not always allowed to use Chapter 13 as an
alternative. If they have too much unsecured debt, they will be forced out of bankruptcy
entirely. 11 U.S.C.A § 109(e) (2007) (limiting Chapter 13 bankruptcy to debtors with less than
$336,900 of unsecured debt). In that situation, debtors could end up paying off their creditors
for the rest of their lives.
149. See supra note 130.
150. See id. § 101(10A) (defining current monthly income as the average income of the six
months prior to filing).
151. Income loss (downsizing, job loss, or other salary reduction) is the most common
reason why people file for bankruptcy, followed by medical problems and divorce. WARREN &
WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 120.
152. There are many debtors who fall in this category. See id. (discussing some of the
reasons debtors file for bankruptcy).
153. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (factoring in salary from the six months prior to filing).
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154
means test looks backwards to the six months prior to filing. If
unemployed debtors are not savvy enough to wait six months after
losing their jobs to file for bankruptcy, the means test will take their
155
old salaries into account in determining current income. The sooner
debtors file for bankruptcy after losing their jobs, the more their old
salaries will factor in the means test, and the worse the overstatement
156
of current income will be.
Before the BAPCPA, judges had discretion to consider
157
postpetition developments in determining income and expense. If a
debtor had lost a job and filed for bankruptcy, the judge could
consider developments in the debtor’s employment situation that
158
occurred after the filing but before the bankruptcy hearing. It was
relevant whether the debtor had found a new job, and whether the
new job paid more or less than the old one.159 Under the BAPCPA,
however, judges look only to the six months prior to filing to
160
determine the debtor’s income. If that number comes out too high,
judges do not have discretion to make a correction.161
Another problem is that the means test can understate actual
expenses, thereby overestimating the ability of debtors to pay back
their creditors.162 The BAPCPA determines allowable expenses by
reference to IRS allowable expense tables, whether or not these
amounts reflect actual reasonable expenses.163 Only in limited
enumerated situations may debtors include their actual expenses in
164
means test calculations.

154. Id.
155. See supra note 153.
156. See supra note 153.
157. In re Cortez, 457 F.3d 448, 455 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that the court may consider
postpetition events).
158. See id. (“[T]he court is entitled to focus on subsequent developments in the debtor’s
financial condition.”).
159. Id.
160. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (Supp. V 2005).
161. If the debtor fails the means test, the judge has no choice but to presume abuse. Id.
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(i). That presumption may be rebutted only under “special circumstances, such as
a serious medical condition or a call to active duty in the Armed Forces.” Id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i).
162. See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (providing that means test expenses are based on IRS tables,
rather than the actual reasonable expenses of the individual debtor).
163. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (“The debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the . . . amounts
specified under the National Standards and the Local Standards . . . .”).
164. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (providing that the debtor may include certain enumerated actual
expenses, including expenses for reasonably necessary health and disability insurance, expenses
reasonably necessary to protect the family from family violence, expenses for care or support of
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The IRS publishes the allowable expense tables for “use in
165
calculating the repayment of delinquent taxes.” A delinquent
taxpayer is allowed to keep a certain level of income per month for
166
subsistence needs, but must turn the rest over to the IRS. The
allowable expense tables tell how much income the delinquent
taxpayer may keep.167 The IRS separates allowable expenses into
three categories: housing and utility costs, transportation costs, and
168
other costs. For housing and utility costs, the allowable expense
level differs by county, depending on the real estate market.169
170
Similarly, the allowable transportation expenses differ by region.
All other allowable expenses (food, housekeeping supplies, apparel,
and services) have national levels. Oddly, these expense levels go up
171
as a delinquent taxpayer’s income goes up. Although a person who
makes less than $833 per month may only keep $175 per month for
food, a person whose monthly income is at least $5834 may keep
almost three times that amount!172
There are two reasons why the means test potentially understates
actual reasonable expenses by reference to the IRS tables. The first is
a flaw in the IRS tables themselves: what could justify allowing
people who have less monthly income to keep significantly less
money for food? The discrepancy across income ranges suggests that
the IRS tables might shortchange low income debtors, allowing them
173
less than reasonable expenses.
The second problem with using the IRS tables is in the way the
means test applies them. The expenses in the table were designed to
be used as a floor.174 When the IRS uses the tables for delinquent

an elderly or chronically ill person, and expenses of up to fifteen hundred dollars per child for
education).
165. Internal Revenue Service, Collection Financial Standards, http://www.irs.gov/
individuals/article/0,,id=96543,00.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. A person whose monthly income exceeds $5833 may keep $483 per month for food. Id.
173. Alternatively, it is possible that the IRS tables allow high income debtors more than
their reasonable expenses.
174. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 163 (“[T]he IRS uses these guidelines as a
floor . . . leav[ing] some room for agents to . . . permit people to spend more for their basic living
expenses if there seems to be a good reason to do so . . . .”).
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taxpayers, it allows the taxpayers to show that they have reasonable
175
expenses in excess of the table amount. The means test, however,
limits debtors to an upward adjustment of 5 percent of the table
176
amounts. It does not consider expenses over that amount, even if
they are necessary in the debtor’s situation.177
B. The BAPCPA’s Loopholes Let Abusive Debtors off the Hook
Not only does the BAPCPA block access to Chapter 7 for certain
needy debtors, it also creates loopholes that allow well-informed
debtors to pass the means test, even though they have the ability to
pay back their debts. First, because of the mechanical way that the
means test determines current monthly income, debtors who
generally have high incomes can pass the means test by reducing their
income for a short period of time prior to filing.178 Second, the means
179
test allows unlimited deductions for secured loan payments.
Debtors who know this ahead of time can reduce their disposable
income, as determined by the means test, by tying up their monthly
income in secured loan payments.180 When a debtor uses one of these
loopholes to pass the means test, it is debatable whether the
bankruptcy judge has discretion to prevent the Chapter 7 filing.181 It is
ironic that the savvy (and likely more affluent) debtors who can take

175. Id. at 162–63 (noting that the IRS explains on its website that “[i]f the IRS determines
that the facts and circumstances of your situation indicates [sic] that using the scheduled
allowance of necessary expenses is inadequate to provide for basic living expenses, we will allow
for your actual expenses. However, you must provide documentation that supports a
determination that using national and local expense standards leaves you an inadequate means
of providing for basic living expenses.”).
176. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (Supp. V 2005) (“[I]f it is demonstrated that it is
reasonable and necessary, the debtor’s monthly expenses may also include an additional
allowance for food and clothing of up to 5 percent.”).
177. See id. (limiting the upward adjustment to 5 percent).
178. See id. § 101(10A) (looking only to the six months prior to filing to determine current
monthly income).
179. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii).
180. See id. (allowing for unlimited secured loan deductions).
181. Culhane & White, supra note 125, at 667 (arguing thatjudges do not have discretion to
dismiss the Chapter 7 filing when a debtor passes the means test). But see Wedoff, supra note
121, at 52 (arguing that judges do have discretion to dismiss petitions even when a debtor passes
the means test).
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advantage of these loopholes are exactly the people who Congress
182
intended to keep out of Chapter 7 when it passed the BAPCPA.
1. Manipulating Income. The means test defines current
monthly income as the average of the debtor’s income in the six
months preceding the bankruptcy filing.183 As discussed, this
definition of income can overstate actual income when a debtor files
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy within six months of becoming
unemployed.184 Well-informed debtors, however, can use the rigid
definition of income to their advantage, manipulating the means test
185
to understate their income. Consider a debtor who loses one job but
has the ability to easily find another. This debtor will have a period
without any income—after losing the first job but before finding the
second. If the time between jobs is at least six months, and if the
bankruptcy filing occurs at the end of this period, the current monthly
income at the time of the bankruptcy petition will be zero, and the
debtor will easily pass the means test, even with high earning
potential and encouraging job prospects.186 Attorneys who represent
consumer debtors are well aware of this phenomenon and know how
187
to use it to their clients’ advantage.

182. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92
(justifying the BAPCPA in part to close “loopholes . . . that allow and—sometimes—even
encourage opportunistic personal filings and abuse”).
183. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (Supp. V 2005).
184. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing how the means test overstates income); see also 11
U.S.C. § 101(10A) (factoring old salary into current monthly income when laid-off workers file
for bankruptcy within six months of losing their jobs).
185. See Braucher, supra note 53, at 1316 (noting the different ways in which debtors might
reduce their incomes before filing).
186. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (defining current monthly income as the average income in
the six months before bankruptcy and not considering earning potential or job prospects in the
determination of current monthly income).
187. See, e.g., Posting of Kevin Chern to The Bankruptcy Lawyers’ Blog: Surviving
Bankruptcy Reform and Bankruptcy Law Changes, http://blog.startfreshtoday.com/2005/09/
articles/bankruptcy-means-test/when-it-comes-to-income-timing-is-everything/ (Sept. 14, 2005,
19:49 EST) (“If your client notifies you of a sudden increase in income, a quick filing may be in
your client’s best interest. If you wait two months after the income change, the six-month
average may increase by enough to bring your client above the median income for the debtor’s
household, triggering application of the means test. You may want to file
quickly . . . . Conversely, if your client has a sudden decrease in income, before filing, you should
reassess whether the means test applies. By waiting a month to three months, the debtor’s sixmonth average income may decrease by enough to eliminate the application of the means
test.”).
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2. Deductions for Secured Loan Payments. A potentially more
dangerous loophole in the means test is the unlimited deduction for
secured loan payments. In calculating disposable income, the
BAPCPA allows debtors to deduct their average monthly payments
188
on account of secured debt. Deductible payments include “the total
of all amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors in
189
each month of the 60 months following the date of the petition,”
and “any additional payments to secured creditors necessary for the
debtor, in filing . . . under Chapter 13 . . . to maintain possession of [a]
primary residence, motor vehicle, or other property necessary for the
support of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents . . . .”190
A debtor should be able to deduct payments on a secured loan
taken out to pay for a basic need, such as a modest home or car.
Expenses for basic needs are deductible under the IRS expense tables
191
when the debtor pays for them outright. There is no reason why
those same basic expenses should not be deductible when financed
with a secured loan. For example, a renter who files for bankruptcy
can deduct reasonable rent under the IRS allowable expense tables.192
It is only fair, then, that homeowners who file for bankruptcy be able
to deduct their reasonable mortgage payments. Financing decisions
should not affect a debtor’s ability to file for Chapter 7.
The problem arises because secured debts do not have to be
193
reasonable to be deductible. Any amount “contractually due to
secured creditors” is deductible, even if the debtor takes out the loan
to purchase a totally unreasonable luxury item.194 A debtor who takes
out a secured loan to buy a piece of jewelry, for example, may deduct
195
the payments on that loan from income. A debtor who pays for the
jewelry outright is, of course, out of luck: the IRS tables do not allow
196
deductions for luxury jewelry expenses. Prior to the means test, the

188. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 2005).
189. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I).
190. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(II).
191. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
192. Internal Revenue Service, Collection Financial Standards, www.irs.gov/individuals
/article/0,,id=96543,00.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
193. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 2005) (allowing deduction of all secured loan
payments).
194. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I).
195. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (allowing for the deductibility of secured loan payments,
regardless of reasonableness).
196. Internal Revenue Service, supra note 165 (allowing only basic expenses).

06__TRIBBLE.DOC

2007]

12/20/2007 10:13:14 AM

BANKRUPTCY

813

FJA did not give payments on secured loans such special treatment.
They were deductible only to the extent that they were reasonable
197
under the debtor’s circumstances.
The problem with the secured loan deduction is not only that it
treats debtors with mostly secured debt much better than debtors
with mostly unsecured debt. More seriously, it also allows
unscrupulous debtors to shelter their income by taking out secured
loans before filing for bankruptcy.198 Consider two debtors, both of
whom want to file for Chapter 7, and both of whom have a monthly
income of $5000, which is just above the median income in their
respective states. One attempts to file for Chapter 7 as is, but fails the
199
means test because a monthly income of $5000 is too high. The
other takes out a secured loan with payments of $1000 per month.
When filing for bankruptcy, the second debtor will be able to deduct
the $1000 from what would otherwise be that individual’s disposable
income.200 This may be enough to allow the second debtor to pass the
means test.201
3. Judicial Discretion to Correct the Means Test When the
Debtor Passes. Because the means test has loopholes which
sometimes allow affluent debtors to pass, the question of whether
judges have discretion to find abuse when a debtor passes the means
test is critical. There is a debate as to the degree of discretion that
judges have to find abuse when a debtor passes the means test.202
Everyone agrees that judges have discretion to find abuse when a
debtor files in bad faith.203 A debtor’s use of the loopholes discussed in
the previous section, however, may be considered either bad faith or
legitimate bankruptcy planning, depending on the degree of income
and expense manipulation. What happens when a debtor passes the

197. See In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 125 (6th Cir. 1989) (taking into account the debtor’s high
monthly mortgage in determining whether the debtor could cut back and pay his creditors).
198. Braucher, supra note 53, at 1316.
199. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (Supp. V 2005) (setting forth the means test).
200. See id. § 707(b)(2)(iii) (allowing deductions for secured loan payments).
201. See id. § 707(b)(2) (basing means test results on disposable income, which is income
minus expenses). Of course, if debtors are too brazen with their plans, they will have to worry
about judges finding bad faith and dismissing their cases under § 707(b)(3), which allows judges
to dismiss any bankruptcy petition filed in bad faith. Id. § 707(b)(3).
202. See sources cited supra note 181.
203. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(A) (explicitly stating that judges may dismiss a bankruptcy
petition filed in bad faith).
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means test only because of one of its loopholes, but the debtor’s
actions do not rise to the level of bad faith?
Section 707(b)(3) states that when the presumption of abuse
“does not arise or is rebutted, the court shall consider whether the
debtor filed the petition in bad faith; or [whether] the totality of the
circumstances . . . of the debtor’s financial situation demonstrates
204
abuse.” Some commentators argue that under the plain language of
this provision, judges have discretion to find abuse when a good faith
205
debtor passes the means test. Others disagree, arguing that if a
debtor passes the means test, a judge must allow the bankruptcy
petition unless it was filed in bad faith.206 If judges do not have
discretion to find abuse when a good faith debtor passes the means
207
test, loopholes become an even more serious problem.
C. The Means Test as Red Tape
One defense commonly offered in favor of bright-line rules like
the means test is that although they do not always get the correct
result, they are more efficient.208 Although this may be true generally,
it is not true in the case of the means test. The means test has
tremendously complicated the process of filing for bankruptcy, and
the Congressional Budget Office estimates that in its first five years, it
will have increased budget deficits by almost $400 million.209
This expense is primarily the result of increased administrative
requirements for both filers and the government.210 Under the
BAPCPA, debtors must submit evidence of any payment received

204. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3).
205. See Wedoff, supra note 121, at 52 (arguing that under the plain language of the statute,
judges have discretion to dismiss petitions even if the debtor passes the means test).
206. See Culhane & White, supra note 125, at 667 (arguing that because the means test is the
sole measure of abuse, judges do not have discretion to dismiss petitions when a debtor passes
the means test).
207. Congress ought to change income and expense calculations to crack down on these
loopholes. See infra Part III.B–C. If Congress is unwilling to do that, however, it becomes
essential to allow judges discretion to find abuse when a debtor uses a loophole to pass the
means test.
208. See generally Kathleen Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22, 63 (1992) (“[R]ules promote economies for the legal decisionmaker by minimizing the
elaborate, time consuming, and repetitive application of background principles to facts.”).
209. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 131, at 1.
210. See Braucher, supra note 53, at 1308 (noting the ways in which the 2005 Act creates
more paperwork for debtors and their attorneys).
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211
from an employer during the sixty days prior to filing. Furthermore,
each debtor must submit a tax return and a certificate of notice of
various credit counseling services.212 These are the least of the means
test’s administrative burdens. Under the BAPCPA, even the poorest
of debtors must submit a Form B22A means testing calculation to file
for bankruptcy.213 The U.S. Trustee’s office then reviews every means
214
test result and sends a statement of its findings to every creditor.
Then, for every above-median debtor, the Trustee’s office must either
move to dismiss the Chapter 7 petition,215 or if the Trustee’s office
decides not to make such a motion, make a statement explaining its
216
decision.
As this Part has discussed, the BAPCPA makes life unnecessarily
difficult for debtors who honestly need the bankruptcy system, it
opens up loopholes for those sophisticated enough to manipulate the
bankruptcy system, and it costs taxpayers money. But what can be
done to address these problems? The next Part proposes revisions to
the BAPCPA that would make the Act both less costly and more
effective at achieving its primary abuse prevention goal.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Congress should revise the means test to allow judges more
discretion in identifying abusive debtors. The most effective revision
would be a compromise between the BAPCPA’s bright-line means
test and the FJA’s fuzzy substantial abuse standard. Congress should
continue to dictate the acceptable level of disposable income and
propose generally acceptable expenses. At the same time, however,
Congress should delegate to judges the authority to determine
disposable income for each debtor by adjusting allowable expenses
upward or downward given individual circumstances. Also, judges
should have discretion to disallow deductions for unreasonable
secured loans. Finally, Congress should allow debtors to rebut the
presumption of abuse whenever they incurred their debt because of
an unforeseen emergency. This compromise would create a more

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(C) (Supp. V 2005).
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 165.
Id.
Id.
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effective and efficient system for screening abusive debtors out of
Chapter 7.
A. Keep the Basics: Codify the Acceptable Level of Disposable
Income
First, in administering the compromise, Congress should retain
the most basic tenet of the means test—the presumption of abuse
when disposable income exceeds a certain amount. As demonstrated
by the BAPCPA, Congress wants to keep out of Chapter 7 those
people who have enough disposable income to make substantial
payments outside of bankruptcy.217 This general policy was also
218
evident in pre-BAPCPA case law. Congress should continue to
state explicitly exactly how much disposable income it considers
enough to make substantial payments. Under the means test, the
magic number is between $100 and $166.66 per month, depending on
the total amount owed by the debtor.219 These numbers should remain
law; they give judges a usable, quantitative standard for making abuse
determinations without necessarily imposing administrative costs or
unfairness.
B. Allow Judges to Determine Income and Expenses
Second, Congress should change the way in which the means test
determines income and expenses. Congress should repeal the means
test’s rigid definition of current monthly income and instead allow
bankruptcy judges to determine monthly income based on the
debtor’s individual circumstances.220 In making this determination,
judges should be able to consider postpetition events—such as
changes in a debtor’s employment situation—that the means test fails
to take into account. This would prevent overestimation of income

217. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 88 (noting
that the BAPCPA is intended to ensure that debtors repay the “maximum they can afford”).
218. See supra note 64–68 (noting that in every circuit but one, ability to pay was the
primary factor in determining abuse).
219. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. V 2005).
220. The means test defines current income as the average of the debtor’s income in the six
months prior to filing. When debtors file for bankruptcy because they have lost their jobs and
cannot find new ones with comparable salaries, this approach tends to overstate actual income
by factoring in a debtor’s old salary. On the other hand, when debtors lose their jobs but have
the potential to find other jobs that pay just as much or more, this approach tends to understate
actual income by factoring in the months when a debtor was not employed. See supra Part
II.A.2.
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when debtors lose their jobs and are unlikely to find other jobs with
comparable salaries. It would also cut down on the ability of abusive
debtors to shelter their income by strategically timing their petition.
Finally, allowing a bankruptcy judge to determine income would cut
down on the burdensome paperwork involved with Chapter 7.
Congress should also change the means test’s definition of
allowable expenses. the means test determines allowable expenses by
221
reference to the IRS allowable expense tables. But these tables are
flawed in that they discriminate across income ranges. Congress
should create a revised version of the IRS expense tables in which
allowable expenses stay consistent throughout income ranges. Judges
could use this revised table as a starting point for determining what
expenses will be allowed in the disposable income calculation.
Another problem with the means test’s use of the IRS tables is
that judges may not consider actual necessary expenses more than 5
222
percent above the table amount. But income should not be deemed
disposable if it is used to pay necessary expenses. There are very good
reasons why one debtor might have greater necessary expenses than
another. Congress therefore ought to amend the law to allow debtors
to prove actual necessary expenses in excess of the 5 percent limit.
C. Close the Secured Loan Loophole
Third, Congress should limit the deduction for secured loan
payments to cover only payments on loans taken out to finance
reasonable expenses. This would make Chapter 7 fairer by treating
debtors with secured loan payments in the same manner as debtors
with payments on unsecured loans. It would also shut down one
major loophole that affluent debtors can use to shelter their income.223
As discussed in Part II, a debtor should not be allowed to deduct an
unlimited amount for payments on secured loans, regardless of
whether he took those loans out to pay for unreasonable luxury items
or necessary goods.

221. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
222. Id.
223. See Braucher, supra note 53, at 1316 (explaining the loophole created by the unlimited
secured loan deduction).
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D. Allow Judges to Consider the Reason for Filing
Finally, Congress ought to make the presumption of abuse
rebuttable whenever debtors incur their debt because of an
unforeseen emergency, even if the emergency does not alter their
income or expenses. Under the BAPCPA, the presumption of abuse
is rebuttable only to the extent that special circumstances affect the
debtor’s income and expenses.224 To prevent unfairness to debtors
with good reasons for filing,225 the presumption ought to be rebuttable
whenever the debtor has a special circumstance, regardless of whether
future income or expenses will be affected.
Once the debtor rebuts the presumption of abuse, the
bankruptcy judge must determine whether to allow a Chapter 7
petition in spite of the debtor’s disposable income. In making this
decision, judges ought to consider the burden that not being able to
226
file will have on the debtor and whether the debtor could have
foreseen and planned for the special circumstance that led to the
filing. They should, in other words, balance the creditors’ interests
against the debtor’s need for a fresh start.
CONCLUSION
Abandoning judicial discretion in favor of a rigid means test was
a policy mistake. The means test allows some debtors who are
abusing the bankruptcy system into Chapter 7 but keeps certain
honest but unfortunate debtors out. Moreover, it adds another layer
of red tape to an already complicated bankruptcy process. Congress
should change the law to allow judges more discretion in identifying
abusive debtors. Not only would this cut down on the BAPCPA’s
administrative burden, it would further the BAPCPA’s primary goal
of preventing abuse. Discretion, however, is not a cure-all. Prior to
the BAPCPA, bankruptcy judges had too few guidelines as to when
Chapter 7 was appropriate. This led to disparate decisions among the
circuits. In such an environment, debtors like Kim Basinger were able
to squirm out of their obligations.

224. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i).
225. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing debtors who have sympathetic reasons for incurring
debt, such as a medical emergency).
226. In evaluating this burden, judges should consider whether the debtor is able to file for
Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C.A § 109(e) (2007) (limiting Chapter 13 to debtors who owe less than
$336,900 of unsecured debt).
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Thus, Congress should find a compromise between the confusion
that existed under the FJA and the rigid and unforgiving means test.
Congress should give judges guidelines by indicating the acceptable
level of disposable income and promulgating a revised version of the
IRS tables. At the same time, it should allow judges to determine
disposable income for each debtor and adjust necessary expenses
upward or downward given individual circumstances. Judges should
also have discretion to disallow deductions for unreasonable secured
loan payments. Finally, debtors should be able to rebut the
presumption of abuse whenever they incurred debt because of an
unforeseen emergency. Such a compromise would go a long way
toward keeping debtors like Kim Basinger out of bankruptcy while
leaving debtors like Shirley Nichols with their time-honored chance
for a fresh start.

